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## Questions ### 1. A clinic's patient database is encrypted by ransomware. Staff can't open any record, but nothing has been copied or changed. Which CIA property failed? *Objective: 1. Explain the CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity, availability) and give an example of a failure of each.* - A) Confidentiality, because the records are no longer readable by staff. - B) Integrity, because the files were modified by the encryption. - C) Availability, because the data can't be used when it is needed. - D) Authenticity, because the files no longer show who wrote them. ### 2. A bank wants to be sure that nobody, not even a staff member with database access, can quietly change a customer's balance without leaving evidence. Which pair of properties does this mostly protect? *Objective: 1. Explain the CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity, availability) and give an example of a failure of each.* - A) Integrity and non-repudiation, because changes must be prevented or traceable to a person. - B) Confidentiality and availability, because balances must be private and always online. - C) Availability and authenticity, because balances must be reachable and genuine. - D) Confidentiality and non-repudiation, because only the owner may see balances. ### 3. A small shop's web server runs software with a known flaw that hasn't been patched. A criminal group scans the Internet looking for that flaw. The server holds the shop's customer orders. Which of these is the asset? *Objective: 2. Distinguish assets, threats, vulnerabilities and risk, and identify common threat actors.* - A) The unpatched flaw in the software. - B) The criminal group scanning the Internet. - C) The customer orders and the web service that would be harmed. - D) The scanning tool the criminal group uses. ### 4. A former employee still has a working login two months after leaving. One evening he downloads the customer list out of anger. Which threat actor is this? *Objective: 2. Distinguish assets, threats, vulnerabilities and risk, and identify common threat actors.* - A) A hacktivist, because he acted out of a grievance. - B) An insider, because he abused legitimate access he should no longer have had. - C) A nation state, because he targeted a whole organisation. - D) An opportunistic criminal, because he used a stolen password. ### 5. A risk is judged "possible" (3) and its impact "severe" (5). Another is "almost certain" (5) and "minor" (1). Using likelihood × impact with the bands low 1–7, medium 8–14 and high 15–25, what are the bands? *Objective: 3. Estimate a risk as likelihood × impact and rank risks in a simple risk register.* - A) Both are high, because each has a 5 in it. - B) The first is high (15) and the second is low (5). - C) The first is medium (8) and the second is high (6). - D) Both are medium, because 15 and 5 average to 10. ### 6. Your risk register contains three risks: A scores 9, B scores 20 and C scores 15. You have budget to fix only one now. Which do you start with, and what do you do about the others? *Objective: 3. Estimate a risk as likelihood × impact and rank risks in a simple risk register.* - A) Risk A, because it is the easiest to explain; ignore B and C. - B) Risk C, because the middle score is the most balanced; review B later. - C) Risk B, because it has the highest score; keep A and C on the register and treat them next. - D) None: scores are guesses, so no ranking is possible. ### 7. A small firm buys cyber insurance so that a ransomware incident wouldn't bankrupt it. It does not change any of its systems. Which risk treatment is this, and what is still true? *Objective: 3. Estimate a risk as likelihood × impact and rank risks in a simple risk register.* - A) Mitigation: the likelihood of ransomware is now lower. - B) Avoidance: the firm has stopped the risky activity. - C) Acceptance: the firm does nothing about the risk. - D) Transfer: part of the cost moves to the insurer, but the firm still has to deal with the incident and its customers. ### 8. A web server logs every failed login and sends an alert when one account fails 20 times in a minute. How is this control classified? *Objective: 4. Classify security controls by purpose (preventive, detective, corrective) and by type (technical, administrative, physical).* - A) Technical and detective: software that notices suspicious activity. - B) Technical and preventive: it stops the attacker from guessing passwords. - C) Administrative and detective: the alert is for the security team. - D) Technical and corrective: it repairs the damage after a break-in. ### 9. After a phishing incident, a company reviews its controls and lists: (1) a written rule that staff must report suspicious e-mails, (2) a camera at the server room door, (3) restoring the shop from last night's backup. Which is the correct classification, in order? *Objective: 4. Classify security controls by purpose (preventive, detective, corrective) and by type (technical, administrative, physical).* - A) Administrative and preventive; physical and detective; technical and corrective. - B) Technical and detective; physical and preventive; administrative and corrective. - C) Administrative and corrective; technical and detective; physical and preventive. - D) Physical and preventive; administrative and detective; technical and corrective. ### 10. A company protects its customer data with one very expensive firewall. An attacker steals a staff password with a phishing e-mail, logs in through the normal login page and downloads the data. Which change best follows defence in depth and least privilege together? *Objective: 5. Explain defence in depth and least privilege, and apply them to a small scenario.* - A) Buy a second firewall from the same vendor, because two are better than one. - B) Add MFA and login alerts, and give each staff account access only to the data its job needs. - C) Give everyone admin rights so they can report problems themselves. - D) Remove the firewall and rely on staff training alone. --- ## Answer key <details> <summary>Show answers</summary> | # | Answer | Explanation | |---|---|---| | 1 | C | Nothing was copied or wrongly changed in the content; the problem is that staff can't use the data when they need it, which is availability. The ransomware's encryption makes the files unusable, but the information itself is intact. | | 2 | A | Preventing unauthorised change is integrity, and traceability so nobody can deny a change is non-repudiation (for example through logs). Confidentiality is about who can read, not who can change. | | 3 | C | The asset is what has value and would be harmed: the customer orders and the web service. The unpatched flaw is the vulnerability, and the criminal group is the threat (the threat actor). The scanning tool is just how the threat finds the vulnerability. | | 4 | B | An insider is someone with legitimate access, here a login that should have been removed. Hacktivists act for a political or social cause, not a personal grievance, and he didn't need a stolen password. | | 5 | B | 3 × 5 = 15, which is high; 5 × 1 = 5, which is low. A severe impact can make a less likely risk high, and a very likely but trivial one stays low, so the product matters, not a single number. | | 6 | C | Rank by score and start with the highest (B, 20). The others stay on the register and are treated in order (C, then A). Scores are judgements, but they are still useful for ordering. | | 7 | D | Insurance transfers part of the financial impact. It doesn't lower the likelihood (that would be mitigation) and the firm remains responsible for the incident response and for its customers. | | 8 | A | It is software (technical) and it notices an attack (detective). It doesn't block the guesses, so it isn't preventive, and it doesn't repair anything, so it isn't corrective. | | 9 | A | A written rule is an administrative control that aims to stop or reduce incidents (preventive). A camera is physical and detects. A restore from backup is technical and corrects the damage. | | 10 | B | The attack got past the one layer by using a stolen password. MFA and alerts add independent layers (preventive and detective), and least privilege limits what a stolen account can reach. A second firewall from the same vendor is the same layer, and admin rights for all breaks least privilege. | </details>